part I part II part III
Two Factions
Within the Bourgeois-Imperialist Counter-Revolution
Part II
Extracted from: Besooy-e-Sosyalism No.2 August 1980
In the last part, we stated that the internal conflicts of the government are the reflexion of disagreement within the bourgeoisie, between the monopoly and non-monopoly bourgeoisie, over methods of con-fronting the revolution and strengthening the foundations of imperialist production and exploitation. We also said that it is only the monopoly bourgeoisie's policy that can lead the entire bourgeoisie to unity under its banner. But, in the absence of the genuine and direct political representatives of the monopoly bourgeoisie, who were driven out of the practical scene of politics by the revolution in general and the February Uprising in particular, the policy of the imperialist monopolies could only be propagandised and pursued by the existing government, and on the basis of function of its different factions. This means that:
1) Neither of the present factions of government are the direct, genuine and stable representatives of monopoly capital; and the reappearance of these representatives in the practical scene of politics requires certain objectives and subjective grounds to be brought about in the society in general and within the bourgeoisie in particular. The monopoly bourgeoisie is striving to provide these objective and subjective conditions.
2) The conformity of the policy of the imperialist reaction with the factions of the government is a temporary conformity which et every juncture assumes its expression mainly in the policies of one of the existing factions. Until before the Uprising, when the question for imperialism was the ever more protection of the governmental apparatus from the threat of the revolutionary masses' offensive, the imperialist reaction was tactically in unity with the liberal bourgeoisie. After the Uprising, when the need for adopting the policy of "suppression of the revolution under the name of revolution" was placed on the agenda of imperialism, the monopoly bourgeoisie put into force its policy mainly through that religious petty-bourgeois current which until the winter of 57 (1979-Ed) had undertaken the leadership of the mass movement, and then, right from before the Uprising had completely turned away from revolution and adhered to imperialist reaction. The Islamic Republican Party is the product and the agent of this reactionary tactical unity after the Uprising, and the policy prevailing in this Party, as a single political organ and not a collection of individuals and circles, is the policy of the imperialist monopolies.
3) Thus the struggle within the ruling body is the reflexion of the struggle between the monopoly and the non-monopoly bourgeoisie over the attainment of political hegemony in the camp of the counter-revolution, without being at the same time the struggle between the class organisations of these two strata of the bourgeoisie. The IRP is not the class organisation of the monopoly bourgeoisie, but is a temporary political instrument for the latter. Nor could Bani-Sadr's faction, which basically lacks an organisational structure, be regarded as the class organisation of the non-monopoly bourgeoisie. Therefore, the consolidation of the monopoly bourgeoisie's hegemony within the bourgeoisie does not only imply the unity of the ranks of the bourgeoisie under the banner (program, tactics and methods) of monopoly capital, but also implies the emergence of the real political organisation of monopoly capital. Hence, we consider the product of the struggles within the government as to be a political synthesis within the bourgeoisie, for we assess the final result of these conflicts as not the unilateral supremacy of one of the existing factions over the other, survival and consolidation of one and the destruction of the other, but the emergence of that third force which would undertake the direct, genuine and stable representation of the monopoly bourgeoisie.
Here, we reach the second question we posed in the last part, that is, what ideological and political features and aspects must this single leadership of the bourgeoisie possess? Or, in more precise terms, which features and aspects of the two present factions must be maintained, expanded and promoted in this third force, and which aspects and features must be negated and discarded?
Before answering this question, and in order to do so more clearly, it is necessary to mention a point: our understanding of the two factions of the ruling body up to this point clearly makes evident its difference with the perception prevailing in the communist movement which recognises the IRP as the political representative of the petty-bourgeoisie -- or the traditional petty-bourgeoisie -- and thus assess the axis of internal differences of the government as being the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the petty- bourgeoisie over power. Our effort in this article is to present our views positively, and not in a polemical manner. However, let us here pose this question that how basically Marxists must make their decision on the class character of the IRP? By assessing the economic situation and productive position of those strata and individuals who take part in the IRP's action? By assessing the economic situation and productive position of the IRP's cadres and activists? By attempting to discover documents shoving the financial and executive connection of the IRP and/or its members with certain bourgeois and petty-bourgeois circles? By believing in whatever the IRP says about itself? By assessing the class alignment of "Islam" in general, or that of "clergy" again in general? No doubt that the answer to all these questions is: No. Marx has given the key to solve the problem:
"What makes them representatives of the petty-bourgeoisie is the fact that in their minds they do not get behind the limits which the latter do not get beyond in life that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and solutions to which material interest and social position drives the latter practically. This is, in general, the relationship between the political and literary representatives of a class and the class they represent." (K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte)
In this article, we can not deal with all "problems and solutions" to which the IRP "are driven". However, in this limited framework of the discussion of the two factions, and in examining the attitude of the two factions towards the fundamental problems placed before the counter-revolution, we, among other things, shall try to show that the IRP not only in its policies goes further than the problems and methods of the petty-bourgeoisie in its actual existence, but persistently endeavour (and this endeavour makes up the raison d'être of the IRP) to carry further with itself the petty-bourgeoisie up to the point of conformity with the policy of imperialism against our revolution. If we succeed to show this point, we have reached the half way -- and only halfway -- of the concrete explanation of class character of the IRP, for we have shown that with which specific class interests the policies prevailing in the IRP lie coinciding. But, this very step would suffice to question the notion that regards the IRP as the representative of the petty-bourgeoisie.
We summarised the fundamental problems facing the counter-revolution as follows: 1) How must the revolution be suppressed? 2) How must imperialist exploitation, and on whose basis, the accumulation of capital, be resumed in the society? What are the general outlines of the policies of the factions within the ruling body regarding these problems?
1) The suppression of the revolution
The fate of the revolution is pledged on the formation and ultimate confrontation of the two camps of the revolution and the counter-revolution. What do the two factions of the ruling body contemplate over the course of formation and development of these two camps, and over the strong and weak points of each one? And what practical guide-lines they place before the bourgeoisie?
The present epoch is the epoch of proletarian revolutions, the epoch of moribund capitalism and the epoch of revolutionary struggle of toiling masses of the world against imperialism. Even where these struggles take shape in the framework of democratic struggles, the proletariat constitutes its backbone and the main motivating force. Marxism-Leninism, as the revolutionary ideology of the proletariat in the present epoch, is indisputably the most coherent and consistent revolutionary ideology of our time. The communist movement, by a general definition, has constituted, and is constituting, the active section of most of the revolutionary struggles of the twentieth century. The counter-revolutionary policy of imperialism in our time generally, and in our revolution particularly, must be adapted to this reality and relied on the suppression of the proletarian movement and extermination of its conscious vanguards throughout the world; and it has been so for a long time. Anti-communism is the essential pillar of the policy of imperialism in the present epoch; and any anti-communist force, irrespective of its social and class base, in the final analysis, operates towards accomplishing the policy of imperialism.
The IRP is in complete, overt and direct conformity with this fundamental component of the policy of imperialism (i.e. anti-communism), to the extent that this general content of the policy of imperialism makes up the specific motive of the movement and the raison d'être of this Party. The IRP consistently calls upon the bourgeoisie to adopt the policy of suppressing and exterminating the workers' and communist movement, and whenever the bourgeoisie, for different reasons, exhibits negligence in doing so, the IRP itself directly employs its utmost effort, using its organisational facilities, to accomplish this policy from the above of the bourgeoisie and its government. The IRP clearly and out-rightly shows to the bourgeoisie the main battle-front. From this point of view, the IRP is the loud speaker of monopoly capital in the agitation and propaganda for its most fundamental counter-revolutionary policy (i.e., anti-communism).
The proletarian movement and communism, as the pillars of the anti-imperialist revolutions of the present epoch, must be suppressed": this is the message of monopoly capital to the Iranian bourgeoisie, a message which is openly reflected in the policy, methods and daily practice of the IRP. Therefore, insofar as the main motivating force of our anti-imperialist revolution and that political leadership who in the final analysis can, and must, unite the camp of the revolution under its banner and lead it to victory, are concerned, the IRP has no illusion and does not cause any illusions in the camp of the counter-revolution. The IRP well recognises the point of strength of the camp of the revolution -- that is the active presence of the revolutionary proletariat and its communist vanguard -- in our country and in our revolution. This is a cognition that monopoly capital and its political representatives have for a long time reached, and the IRP, from the view point of political "far-sightedness" in this connection, not only goes beyond the petty-bourgeoisie but in reality has nothing less than the likes of Kissinger and Berzensky.
The complementary of this fundamental understanding of the camp of the revolution, is another fundamental understanding concerning the requirements of the formation and organisational build-up of the camp of the counter-revolution. Anti-communism, from the viewpoint of monopoly capital and especially in the dominated country, has an unbreakable link with the rejection of bourgeois liberalism. As we have frequently explained in our other writings, in the dominated country, where the tendency of monopoly capital to maintain and strengthen political reaction must inevitably acquire its overall and complete manifestation, liberalism is not a reliable and favourable political superstructure. In such countries, the imperialist overt violence and reaction is, in the final analysis, the most suitable way that capital of the epoch of imperialism knows to establish its sway. Bourgeois liberalism, which stands for concurrent class dictatorship and counsellorship within the bourgeoisie, is by no means compatible with the long term needs of the accumulation of capital in the dominated country. The tendency of capitalism of the epoch of monopolies to political reaction, turns the bourgeois-liberal outlook in the dominated country into a relic, which only in certain instances and within a specific and limited framework could it acts as a politico-ideological instrument in the service of the bourgeoisie. In the present epoch and in our country, the bourgeois liberals are the most confused politicians of the bourgeoisie. They are of some use to capital only insofar as illusion-making is itself a political instrument. This is precisely the role that until the Uprising the liberal bourgeoisie of Iran had undertaken in order to bridle the revolution which was about to endanger the sway of the entire bourgeoisie. But, where these bourgeois-liberal illusions go beyond this, and the bourgeois-liberals put forward and insist upon the concurrent class dictatorship and inner-class democracy as the superstructure of capitalist society in Iran, monopoly capital itself, before anybody else, declares their political bankruptcy. In the imperialist countries, liberalism enjoys specific objective bases; bases which themselves, first and foremost, rely on the decline of liberalism in the dominated country. Hence, the bourgeois-liberals in Iran must recognise their place, not fly high, and admit the existence of "unilateral centralism- and the exercise of the leadership of monopoly capital in the ranks of the bourgeois counter-revolution as well as in the political sway of capital over labour. The inner unity of the bourgeois counter-revolution itself requires convincing and/or shutting up the liberal bourgeoisie. It also requires making the bourgeoisie understand the need for adopting the policy of "over violence under the leadership of monopoly capital". In con-fronting the revolution, the whole of the bourgeoisie undoubtedly becomes aware of the necessity of the unity of its ranks. But, those bourgeois political forces are "wise" and "conscious" to the interests of the entire class, who recognise this unity as possible not by means of "inner-class democracy" and representation of all strata of the bourgeoisie in political power, but by the rejection of liberalism and indisputable acceptance of the political leadership of monopoly capital in the entire class.
The IRP well reflects in itself this "wisdom" of the monopolies. Today, the IRP advances this "impatient" centralism and this undeniable necessity of overt violence. The widespread attempt by the IRP to weaken the bases of the liberals' power, and also to limit the liberal methods of government, is another evidence of the conformity of this Party's operation with the general policy of imperialism in creating the grounds for organisation of the ranks of the bourgeoisie. The operation of the IRP is compatible with this undeniable reality that the smallest democratic openings and the slightest procrastination by the bourgeoisie and its government to revive Aryamehrian repression would pave the way for the revolutionary proletariat and provide the grounds for its growth in political consciousness and class organisation. The operation of the IRP is compatible with this reality that, that force which more than others benefits from the adoption of liberal methods on the part of the bourgeois government, and even from existence of open contradiction in it which [may] result in failure or wavering in accomplishing its suppressive duties, is the young communist movement. The operation of the IRP is compatible with this reality that for any moment that the communists can be able to enjoy the open conditions for their agitational, propaganda and politico-organisational activity, the bourgeoisie gets hundreds of steps closer to its downfall, and the consolidation of its class sway becomes hundreds of times more difficult. Therefore, the IRP refuses beforehand the adoption of those laws which, even in form, remains silence with regard to the anti-worker, anti-communist and anti-democratic violence, and where under the pressure of the masses' democratism, the liberals exhibits wavering, or taken on a peaceful appearance to attract conciliators in the ranks of the revolutionary movement, the IRP itself, from outside of all laws and promises, and even at the expense of making evident the internal conflicts of the politicians of the class, assigns the black-bandist thugs to make up for the past.
But, what does Bani-Sadrism say in this respect? This tendency, too, is undoubtedly an anti-communist tendency in its essence and from top to bottom. However, contrary to the IRP which unveils for the bourgeoisie the undeniable reality of our revolution, shows the bourgeoisie the main fronts of the battle and tries to convince it on its openly suppressive tasks as regards the workers' and communist movement, Bani-Sadrism which in essence is nothing but bourgeois-liberal in an opportunist compromise with methods of religious expression, downplays for the bourgeoisie the role and place of the revolutionary proletariat and its revolutionary ideology, Marxism-Leninism. Bani-Sadrism infuses the bourgeoisie with a politico-ideological self-confidence and also with false and utopian economic ideas that can by no means be realised in our country, as a country dominated by imperialism. If the IRP, by relying on economic, political and ideological realities of capitalism of the present epoch in general and that of our country in particular, tries to convince the bourgeoisie of Iran on the necessity of the ever more decisive participation in the counter-revolutionary and class struggle against the revolutionary proletariat, Bani-Sadrism claims that there exist such economic, political and ideological grounds in the society that supposedly enables the bourgeoisie to alleviate the class struggle. The IRP starts from the perception of the features of capitalism of the epoch of imperialism in the dominated country, recognising the main enemy of the bourgeoisie, that is the revolutionary proletariat and Marxism-Leninism, and discerning the objective and subjective grounds of its growth. Bani-Sadrism, on the contrary, covers up these features and exaggerates in the economic, political and ideological capabilities of the Iranian bourgeoisie in confronting the proletariat. The starting point of Bani-Sadrism is the observation of the successes of the bourgeoisie of imperialist countries of Western Europe and America, but it does not understand the objective bases of these successes, and naively sees as possible the realisation of similar conditions in Iran. Bani-Sadrism assures the Iranian bourgeoisie that there exist favourable economic grounds to alleviate the struggles of the proletariat and non-proletarian toilers against capital in Iran. The economic proscription that Bani-Sadr wraps for the bourgeoisie of Iran, a prescription that is supposed to sweep under the feet of the communist movement, is a utopian prescription which has by no means taken into account the specific economic place of Iran as a dominated country. Bani-Sadrism is the advocate of the thesis "national and independent economy" within the bourgeoisie, and precisely the same as the opportunist tendency in the communist movement, regards the objective basis of bourgeois democracy in the present epoch as being "economic independence" and not imperialist exploitation. The division of the countries of the world into imperialist and dominated, imperialist exploitation of the toilers of the dominated countries, imperialist super-profits of the monopolies by means of the export of capital, the emergence and continuance of labour aristocracy in the imperialist countries, the dominance of revisionism and trade-unionism in the communist and workers' movement of these countries, are all necessary and inter-connected links which secure the possibility of bourgeois democracy and liberalism to appear in the imperialist countries. Bani-Sadrism covers up these realities, and precisely the same as the imperialist ideologues of the countries of Western Europe and America, presents this "liberal capacity" of the bourgeoisie of the metropolitan countries, as the effect of its independence and industrial flourishing", democratic culture and tradition and Its "free debate". Bani Sadrism, as a fully-fledged bourgeois-liberal tendency, is the echo of the extensive anti-communist propaganda with which the bourgeoisie of the metropolitan countries bombards the proletariat of these countries. For the bourgeoisie of Iran, the creation of the objective grounds for adopting liberal methods in politics generally and in government particularly requires Iranian capital-Ism to become imperialist; and this, though not an analytical impossibility is a class-historical impossibility. Liberalism in the epoch of imperialism relies on the fierce exploitation of the toilers of the dominated countries, and the liberals precisely covers up this exploitation. Bani-Sadrism is a defender of capital, and where the toilers of Iran are about to discern capitalism as the cause of all their sufferings, it rises to its feet so as to basically deny the existence of capitalist economy and sometimes even "economy" in Iran, calling to witness implicitly the situation in Western Europe and introducing this situation as the "real" capitalist society. Further, it attempts to propagandize, in the cover of its absurd phrase-mongering, the desirability of establishing this system in an "independent and self-reliant" way, "Touhidi"[4] way, etc, in the face of the revolutionary proletariat and communism which explain the necessity of overthrowing this rotten system. It is natural that the propagation of such illusions among the masses of workers and toilers has a significant place for imperialism; otherwise, Bani-Sadrism would not have been of any use for the bourgeoisie. But, it is to the same extent natural and necessary that the bourgeoisie itself would not set its hopes on these illusions and would not insist on their realization. Hence, Bani-Sadrism is the defender of the general foundations of capitalist economy against the revolutionary proletariat's critique, and not the direct and outright expression of the desirable policy of the bourgeoisie in a given country and at a given juncture. Such a current can have no use but to play the role of an instrument of deceit for the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, though Bani-Sadr's liberal propaganda is in essence nothing but a deceit, in form, it is expressive of a utopia; for the bourgeoisie, basically, cannot deceive the workers except by putting forward its utopias and by concealing the reality of its class interests. Therefore, it would not be wrong to call Bani-Sadrism "bourgeois utopianism", even if Bani-Sadr himself and all his colleagues and aids are, in private, aware of the absurdity of their theories and propaganda.
Likewise, in the ideological political sphere, Bani-Sadrism advocates a -utopian" and unrealistic attitude towards the communist movement. Bani-Sadrism is an advocate of suppression as the bourgeoisie's ultimate solution; a club which would appear from behind of every "free debate". And precisely where the deceits of the government have proved ineffective, as in revolutionary Kurdistan, the two factions reach a consensus on the policy of suppression and its significance for the bourgeoisie. But, Bani-Sadrism, on the whole, primarily demands liberalism to be placed at the axis of the bourgeoisie's policy, and violence is regarded as the executive guarantor of this liberalism. Regarding the attitude towards the communist movement, Bani-Sadrism demands the adoption of liberal methods with the purpose of strengthening the ranks of opportunism in this movement, isolating and suppressing revolutionary Marxism. Nevertheless, this policy is inevitably presented on the part of Bani-Sadr's faction in the society, not in an overt and outright form, but in the form of a demand for ideological confrontation and "free debate" with Marxism as a whole. And such an attitude inevitably stirs up an illusion as regards the politico-ideological ability of the Iranian bourgeoisie in confronting communism. Yes, if the communist movement is overcome economically, it would be possible to confront it at political and ideological level. If opportunism in the communist movement enjoys a firm material basis economically, it would not be an improbable prospect to isolate and drive back revolutionary Marxism. Here, too, the question is over this very if. Bani-Sadrism, therefore, completes its economic utopia with the deceitful theory of "free debate and exchange of ideas". While the bourgeoisie of Iran is about to understand the weakness of its liberal representatives in political and ideological confrontation with the Iranian communist movement (in spite of all its problems and shortcomings), and grasp the necessity of physical struggle with the communist movement, Bani-Sadrism come to the scene to defeat in the free debate the communist movement and the revolutionary ideology of the proletariat before the anxious eyes of the bourgeoisie. The discussion is not here on the extent to which Bani-Sadr and his faction is "consistent" in putting to force such promises, but it is on the dispersion which is stirred up within the bourgeoisie by even declaring these methods as being desired by this class. Even in the metropolitan countries, where imperialism has access to the rich heritage of theoretico-ideological work produced by centuries of endeavour by the intellectuals of the bourgeoisie, it has for long given up intellectual confrontation with communism. Instead, it has' resorted to distorting, falsifying and censorship alongside with -- what is the principal course of action - suppressive confrontation. It is, therefore, quite clear that the Bani-Sadr's policy of "free debate" as regards Marxism is no more than inviting the bourgeoisie to "ideological martyrdom Bani-Sadrism or any bourgeois ideology of the present epoch, would not have the capability of ideological confrontation with revolutionary Marxism, and any illusion and self-confidence in this regard, however temporary and passing it may be, would be deadly for the bourgeoisie. In our view, therefore, in this regard too, the IRP opens up much clearly the realities of the class struggle, before the eyes of the Iranian bourgeoisie.
This problem extends itself to the political sphere. Contrary to the explicit line of the IRP, Bani-Sadrism demonstrates its failure in understanding the relationship between democracy and the struggle of the proletariat for socialism. That the communists grow better and faster in the conditions of underground work in comparison with the conditions of open work, that the more they are suppressed, the more powerful they become, are statements based on a fallacy. Contrary to the IRP, Bani-Sadrism does not recognize the cause of the growth of the communist movement, which is nothing but the validity of the viewpoints and the programs of this movement and their conformity with the class interests of the proletariat, and/or covers it up. The IRP exerts all its efforts to limit the scope of the communist's use of the open conditions for widespread and fast propaganda and agitation for their program and demands. On the contrary, Bani-Sadrism suffers from the illusion that bourgeois liberalism can stand against Marxism in the open conditions, and that driving the communists to the domain of underground activity takes away this possibility form the bourgeoisie. Bani-Sadrism does not comprehend this fact that any democratic achievement in the society serves most effectively the Iranian proletariat, and that the active presence of the proletariat and the communist movement in the democratic revolution has essentially no aim but to create the democratic pre-requisites for the final move towards socialism. Bani-Sadrism is inattentive to the pressing need of the Iranian bourgeoisie to deprive the communist movement of the field of open activity and, in this regard too, remains incapable of the precise recognition of the interests of capital in Iran in the epoch of imperialism.
Thus, we see that the two factions of the ruling body have a common point of departure with regard to confronting the proletarian movement and revolutionary Marxism. Both are the sworn enemies of communism. But, the IRP considers the policy of all-round suppression as the only road to survive the bourgeoisie, while Bani-Sadrism regards this policy as an ultimate solution which must be resorted to only "in the event" of the failure of bourgeois-liberal policies and methods. The IRP, therefore, set out to purge the liberal bourgeoisie and liberal methods from government and political leadership of the bourgeoisie, whereas Bani-Sadrism places supporting and strengthening it on its agenda. From the viewpoint of the interests of monopoly capital, it is the IRP which has clearly understood the problem, and it is Bani-Sadr who is off. The IRP is "realistic" and Bani-Sadr's faction is "confused"; then the IRP must act and pursue its policies in their essence, while Bani-Sadr must fob the masses off with its liberal illusions instead of realities, and decorate the common outcome of [the operation of] the ruling body -- which is nothing but an attempt to suppress the revolution with empty liberal phrases. The attitude of the factions of the ruling body toward communism and consistent democratism of the proletariat on the one hand, and bourgeois-liberalism on the other, clarifies the general framework of their position on forces such as Mojahedin-e-Khalq which oscillate between the two mentioned poles.
The Bani-Sadrist liberalism sees newfangled and "well-thought-of" liberals in the future of the Mojahedin's leaders, who, with a slight alteration, would be ready to turn the past record of revolutionary struggles of their organization and the revolutionary enthusiasm of their young followers into a tool in the bargaining of the non-monopoly bourgeoisie and the imperialist monopolies over economic and political concessions; "well-thought-of" liberals who would help the workers and toiling masses cease struggling and set their hopes on the bourgeois government. If this happens; if a bourgeois-liberal government can in this way attain a social base and political validity, then its political alternative for resolving the problems of the bourgeoisie would acquire a more stronger material basis than that of monopoly capital, and thus the dreadful dream of non-monopoly capital to become deprived of deter-mining its own fate would not come true till a later time. But monopoly capital sees in Mojahedin-e-Khalq, on the one hand, signs of a democraticism which had the potential of following the revolutionary proletariat and its consistent democraticism; and on the other, a force which mixes up the black and white boundaries between the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution and the revolutionary proletariat and its communist van-guards, a force which comes in between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and while in many cases dulls the sharp edge of the revolutionary proletariat's policies against the bourgeois government and parties, and acts as an intermediary in the struggles of the oppressed classes against the imperialist exploitation and oppression, at the same time plays the role of a shock absorber for the communist movement with regard to the suppressive policies of the bourgeoisie. The widespread suppression of the proletarian and communist movement is, therefore, impossible, without at the same time having forces such as Mojahedin-e-Khalq fallen into the abyss of passivity and/or conciliation.
The IRP, which has skilfully linked up the elements of imperialist policy and "fundamentalism", calls the intermediary role of Mojahedin-e-Khalq "ideological eclecticism" and "deviation from Islamic fundamentals"; the Mojahedin are not "fundamentalist", they "oscillate between Islam and communism" and, therefore, hinder the IRP to fulfil its 'fundamentalist" role in the service of imperialism, shedding rivers of blood of revolutionary workers. They must be removed from the way so that imperialism and the IRP could best employ the remnants of the religious convictions of the unconscious masses -- and particularly the unconscious masses of the petty-bourgeoisie -- in the service of suppressing communist movement and thereby the whole of the revolutionary movement; that is, they could resolutely put into force the summon to "exterminate the infidels"[5] -- as they did in Kurdistan, Gonbad and Ahvaz, etc. -- without having any trouble from the amendment "have mercy with those in between".
2) The Counter-Revolutionary Order and the Productive Order
The transformation of the economic crisis into a revolutionary crisis, the weakening of the foundations of the sway of capital and the continuance of the revolutionary crisis have, of necessity, pledged the resolution or a considerable abatement of the economic crisis and the resumption of a new cycle of capital accumulation, from the viewpoint of the total social capital, on the suppression of the revolution. That is, in the eye of the total social capital, the suppression of the revolution and the establishment of counter-revolutionary order precede production. It is precisely monopoly capital which, economically, is in a position that, firstly, it is able to recognise this need of the whole of capitalist economy in Iran -- that is the precedence taken by counter-revolutionary order over production -- and avoid helpless and hasty moves of small and intermediate capitals in the domes-tic market; and secondly, it has such economic capacity that enables it to base its counter-revolutionary policy upon this necessity and make a long-term plan for its movement. Within the domestic market, the individual small capital, which is a small constituent part of the total social capital, starts from the angle of its own narrow and limited interests. For small and intermediate capitals, production and order are indeed identical necessities. For them the desired order is an order which prevents interruption in productive activity and reduces the periods the means of production remain idle to a minimum. In other words, the intended order of these capitals is "productive order", that is the "regular" use of labour by capital. The lower and intermediate strata of the bourgeoisie, even in the context of a civil war, avail themselves of the opportunity of a cease-fire to keep their business going. But, monopoly capital, which gives direction to the movement of the total social capital in the domestic market, considers the capitalist economy of Iran as a whole and as a constituent part of the world imperialist relations, and thus draws up its policy in the service of maintaining this "economy". For the monopoly bourgeoisie the point is not merely whether there occurs an interruption in the process of reproduction of this, or that stratum of capital; rather, it is whether to preserve or to abandon capitalist production in a given country. Small and intermediate capitals, despite all threats facing the whole of the bourgeoisie on the part of the revolution, equate the concept of "order" with concepts such as security, absence of anarchy, presence of workers at work-places, non-stop running of the factories, so forth, and thus equate order with "ceasing hostilities"; whereas, under such circumstances, monopoly capital, in the first place, considers "order" not from the viewpoint of production, but principally from a socio-political point of view -- as an all-sided consolidation of the sway of the counter-revolution and the decisive suppression of the revolution. Monopoly capital, therefore, bases its policy not upon strengthening the police, enacting the labour law, subjecting workers to fines, etc., but rather upon parameters such as the manner of organising the camp of the counter-revolution inside Iran, the balance of forces at the global level, the different governmental alternatives of the bourgeoisie in Iran, the assessment of the prospect of militarization of the Golf, the possibility of the use of armies of the mercenary states in the region, the possibility of partition of Iran, and so forth. The farsightedness of the bourgeoisie is directly proportional to the volume and the turnover period of its capital. So, imperialism - which encompasses the renovation and reproduction of the total social capital and the capitalist social relations in Iran - has by far greater "counter-revolutionary patience" than small and intermediate capitals in the domestic market. Under the existing circumstances in Iran, the monopolies and the imperialist states seek to restore an order which not only is not necessarily occurring the immediate resumption of production, but is in the last analysis a precondition for it. And it is natural that if a temporary disorder, in the context of the monopolies' long-term policy, may practically serve establishing an all-around order desired by the monopolies, they would be the first to cause this disorder in production.
The practice of the IRP indeed confirms this need and capacity of monopoly capital. The IRP out-rightly places priority on an all-around and counter-revolutionary socio-political order rather than resuming production at any cost. The suppression of the revolution is the primary and most vital task that the IRP places before the bourgeoisie, and insists on its accomplishment knowing that it may cost sacrifices in the field of production and accumulation. The IRP is a fully-fledged counter-revolutionary party which defines its tasks not in conjunction with the permanent need of the bourgeoisie to produce value and surplus-value, but with respect to the establishment of such conditions in which the production of value and surplus-value is no longer threatened by the revolutionary movement. Even where the IRP speaks of economy, it pursues a thoroughly political objective. The heads of the IRP one day speak of private property and economic inequality as being holy and natural, and the other day turn to the advocates of economic equality. For the IRP, therefore, economic slogans are a political weapon; politics, counter-revolutionary politics, being their "economic" basis.
But the Bani-Sadrist faction's perception of the concept of order is an abstract perception. Bani-Sadrism, in the first place, looks upon order as productive order. Failure to understand that counter-revolutionary order must precede productive order is expressive of the failure to grasp the specifics of a revolutionary situation. The solution of the economic crisis, form the viewpoint of the bourgeoisie and the total social capital, requires the decisive suppression of the revolution and, as we already stated, monopoly capital, by virtue of its domination over the movement of the total social capital, possesses the necessary economic capacities, scope of action and political farsightedness to adapt its policy to this reality. But Bani-Sadrism's haste to resume production -- what is the reflection of the interests of small and intermediate capitals in the domestic market -- at times goes even to the extent that causes disturbances In the course of establishing the counter-revolutionary order. Bani-Sadr's faction in many cases considers the resumption of production at the level of society even as a precondition for the restoration of order and security. It is quite true that in the normal and non-critical conditions of capitalist production, in non-revolutionary circumstances, the flourishing of production is directly related to the extent to which the toiling masses have submitted to the bourgeois law and obligations. However, applying the relationship between politics and economy of a non-revolutionary situation to a society which is undergoing a revolutionary crisis, and insisting on it, is only expressive of failure to understand the concrete conditions. Obviously, the priority of counter-revolutionary order to productive order should not be interpreted as politics rakes precedence of economy under the existing circumstances in Iran. Economy always, in the last analysis, determines and conditions the political superstructure. But, that which determines and conditions the course of movement of the forces in the political sphere today In Iran is not the needs of the process of production, but it is the pressure exerted by the economic crisis. It is precisely the economic crisis of capitalism in Iran which dictates to the bourgeoisie the necessity that counter-revolutionary order has precedence over productive order. And Bani-Sadrism which, more than any other trend in the Iranian bourgeoisie, lays stress upon the necessity of taking care of the economic situation, is therefore in practice more than the IRP, inattentive to the specific political preconditions of alleviating and overcoming the economic crisis. Here, too, the medal of "realistic attitude" goes to the IRP, and the medal of "confusion" to Bani-Sadrism.
The disagreement between Bani-Sadr's faction and the IRP over the content of the order which the bourgeoisie needs in the first place, inevitably adds fuel to disagreement over the form of establishing this order. If counter-revolutionary order is distinct from productive order, then the means and the process of establishing and maintaining these two kinds of order should also be different. The waves of revolution have to a great extent smashed and made ineffective the formal instruments of preserving the bourgeois law and order. The instruments and institutions which preserve order in the day to day process of production and reproduction in society, i.e. laws, army and police, bureaucracy, judiciary, etc., precisely due to the revolutionary upsurge, which culminated in the February Uprising, have widely ceased functioning. That revolution occurred precisely means that the bourgeoisie and imperialism were no longer able to rule by means of the formal instruments and institutions, and with formal methods. The revolution itself was most vividly expressive of the bourgeoisie's need for resorting to new methods; there existed in the society a revolutionary situation as distinct from non-revolutionary and normal conditions as any "realistic" bourgeois policy could not but to take it into account as a reality, even in determining the form of establishing the desired order of the bourgeoisie. This reality, in so far as the attempt by the bourgeoisie to restore and consolidate the bourgeois law and order is concerned, underlines the need of this class to renovate the suppressive machine in a manner corresponding the specific political situation prevailing in the society. Under the revolutionary situation prevailing in the society, the counter-revolution must itself abandon the bourgeoisie's formal laws and principles; that is to say the counter-revolution must act "revolutionary". This is a genuine counter-revolutionary perception to which monopoly capital has for a long time attained, and on which it has based its global policy in regard to the proletarian and national revolutions. Under revolutionary circumstances, the bourgeoisie is no more content with the issuance of circulars, arrests, trials or the use of the police and other official suppressive forces against demonstrations, strikes, assemblies and generally speaking all methods of struggles which may be employed by the camp of the revolution -- methods which question all existing rules and laws. Rather, under such conditions, the bourgeoisie calls forth the thoroughly reactionary and right-wing extremist bourgeois parties and gangs in order that they -- who are fed in the same manger as the state open or secret police -- could also utilize these new methods of struggle but in the interest of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie and the monopolies themselves in many cases organise reactionary demonstrations, strikes and even armed confrontation with their own government. The IRP exhibits most completely through its policies this understanding -- the understanding of the bourgeoisie's need for employing the new methods of struggle. Before seeking to renovate the bourgeoisie's legal institutions of suppression and political domination (laws, army, bureaucracy, judiciary, etc.), the IRP is striving to mobilize those specific class forces and political organs which in the present circumstances are able to operate in a "revolutionary" manner, and as far as possible in the name of revolution. In so doing, the IRP goes to the extent that overtly puts the name of 'revolution" on its counter-revolutionary policies: "cultural revolution", "administrational revolution", "purging" (which as far as the IRP is concerned has no meaning but purging the communists and the revolutionary democrats), are amongst the numerous examples there exist in this respect. The unconscious masses of the petty-bourgeoisie and the clergy taking hold of their bridle provide the best means for organising a vast counter-revolutionary force. The IRP's methods of action too, relies on elements and factors which could best set in motion this vast force in the service of suppressing the revolution. So the IRP makes the best use of the influence of the clergy and Islam in the traditional petty-bourgeoisie and in unconscious masses generally; an influence for the strengthening of which the farsighted monopolies never ceased striving even prior to the Uprising. The petty-bourgeois have their eyes on Khomeini and Islam. Khomeini who owes his respectability among the masses not to Islamic jurisprudence but to his active presence in anti-monarchist struggles, himself ' only adores establishing Velayat-e-Faghih[6] and attaining a privileged position for the clergy in the hierarchy of power. The IRP, therefore, becomes the most "decisive" adhere of the Imam's[7] line in order to conquer his mind and will -- which has no contradiction with the temporary interests of the imperialist monopolies -- and utilize him for the counter-revolutionary mobilization of the petty-bourgeoisie in the service of the policy of imperialism. The IRP is not a petty-bourgeois party; it is a party which the imperialist monopolies have established for the petty-bourgeoisie and of which they have given a share to the chief of the clan so as to attract his confidence and thereby be granted full authority. What is "valuable" in Islam, as far as the IRP is concerned, is its anti-communist character on the one hand and Khomeini's adoration for it on the other, and these two in union with one another can easily provide the ideological justifications as well as the mass grounds for the policy of "the suppression of the revolution under the name of revolution". The IRP employs Islam in order to mobilize the confused petty-bourgeois masses and, now to a much less extent, certain strata of the proletariat, against the communist and revolutionary movement, getting support from Khomeini in every step. It is obvious that Islam and Khomeini will gain from the long-term policy of the monopolies and the present IRP's activities no more than what they used to receive under the Shah; for neither Islam nor Khomeini can be the constituent elements of the monopolies' governmental superstructure in Iran. Hence, it is not surprising that the IRP is "inattentive" to Islam as a "doctrine", and that the IRP not only does not make any effort to teach and propagate this "doctrine", but in many cases has no hesitation to deteriorate its validity and respect among the masses. The IRP's Islam makes quite evident the thoroughly bourgeois content it, of necessity, appropriates in the epoch of imperialism. For the IRP, Islam is not an ideal or a collection of "ideological and philosophical fundamentals", but it is a completely political instrument which must be mobilized for a certain period. So the IRP leaves the worries for the future of Islam, for the weakening of the "faith" of the masses and their abandonment of Islam and for having "empty mosques" to Khomeini, likes of Ali Tehrani, and Mojahedin-e-Khalq. The IRP is seeking to establish nobody's "ideal Islamic Society", rather it is in pursuit of making use of the counter-revolutionary characteristics and ideals of the petty-bourgeoisie which is today defined and understood in the context of Islam of the likes of Khomeini. It is thus, evident that by the termination of the role of the petty-bourgeois masses as the mere numbers in the counter-revolutionary program of imperialism, the IRP's interest in Islam and Khomeini, too, will come to an end, and then the IRP itself will reach the end of its operation as the "Islamic Republican Party". The reliance of the IRP on Islam, Khomeini and the clergy is precisely an example of the counter-revolutionary reliance of monopoly capital on factors, elements and methods which have come about in a revolutionary situation and beyond the formal capabilities of the bourgeoisie.
But Bani-Sadrism, like bourgeois-liberalism generally, looks upon "counter-revolutionary anarchy" with a critical eye, and demands the restoration of order from the formal governmental organs and institutions of the bourgeoisie from an abstract viewpoint ignorant of the specific conditions and realities in the society. It is true that Bani-Sadr too relies on the agitation of broad masses to confront with the camp of the revolution; but, in such doing, Bani-Sadr and his faction are in pursuit of recalling the "legitimacy" of their power so that they then act by means of executive instruments as well as formal and "legal" methods. In other words, while the IRP strives to mobilize the masses themselves as the instrument for suppression, Bani-Sadr intends to employ the masses' support to organize the formal instruments of the bourgeoisie's suppression and sway. The Bani-Sadrists regards the IRP's methods as adding fuel to anarchy and tension in the society, while the IRP in turn regards the Bani-Sadr'a methods as reformist, liberal and non-revolutionary. In reality both are correct. Bani-Sadr's faction, in organising the counter-revolution, acts not in a "revolutionary" but in a liberal and reformistic manner; this method does not work in fulfilling the political needs of the bourgeoisie under the present conditions. But, on the other hand, one can smell from the methods and actions of the IRP the stink of year, of counter-revolutionary experiences by the imperialist monopolies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Bani-Sadrism sticks itself co Islam and Khomeini and strives to interpret both in a bourgeois-liberal framework. In other words, Bani-Sadrism is the product of an inescapable compromise between bourgeois-liberalism and religious forms and elements imposed in the course of revolution. This compromise is, in a sense, the only road to survive liberalism, taking into account the ideological characteristics dominated over the revolutionary movement until the Uprising and over the government afterwards. The fate of Shayegan, Sanjabi, Mogadam-Maraghei, Nazih and recently Madani[8], the National Front and its various factions as a whole, made Bani-Sadrism and its faction for a long while the only channel through which the liberal bourgeoisie could exist. However, it seems as though the Koran's verses and Khomeini's tendencies confirm the IRP's Islam and rapidly expose the Islamic pretensions of the liberal bourgeoisie. While the IRP actively utilizes Islam as a political tool, the liberalism of the Bani-Sadr kind has a passive attitude towards it. This liberalism turns to "Islam" precisely to the extent that the IRP has directly or indirectly imposed a defensive position upon the liberal bourgeoisie and questioned its Islamic convictions.
Naturally, in such conditions an extensive section of the bourgeoisie in the domestic market looks upon the IRP's methods from a Bani-Sadrist outlook. Under the present conditions, these methods largely impede the renovation of productive forces of the society and the revival and reinforcement of the political and executive organs of the bourgeois rule. Monopoly capital regards this as a price to be paid in short-term which will be made up for by the realization of its' long-term aims. Furthermore, economic anarchy and even crisis brings enormous wealth for certain strata of capitalists. A vast stratum of middlemen and big intermediaries of the purchase and sale of public necessities who find hoarding a favourable ground for superb profit-making, the landowners who take advantage of political anarchy to regain the distributed lands, are examples of such economic successes in the midst of political anarchy. Nevertheless, the economic fortunes brought about by the IRP methods benefits not the entire bourgeois class, but only certain strata of it.
In view of what we have stated so far, it becomes clear why we believe that neither of the existing two factions of the ruling body can be the ultimate alternative and class organisation of the Iranian bourgeoisie.
In so far as the role of the liberal bourgeoisie in our country is concerned, we have not advanced in this article, novel specifics for this stratum. Bani-Sadrism is a certain form of bourgeois-liberalism whose characteristics lies in the general framework of liberalism in our country. The only peculiarity of Bani-Sadrism is its religious manner of expression and its ability to adapt to ideological-political forms dominated over the revolutionary movement before the Uprising and over the government afterwards. The failure of the liberal bourgeoisie to present a political and governmental alternative to the bourgeoisie in Iran as en imperialist-dominated country also includes Bani-Sadrism. Our discussion about Bani-Sadr's faction is, therefore, only an emphasis on our former position regarding this stratum of the bourgeoisie. Being in unbreakable union with the operation of imperialism in Iran, bourgeois-liberalism cannot be the central policy of the bourgeoisie under the leadership of the monopoly bourgeoisie with regard to the Iranian revolution, nor can it provide the ideological-political framework of the bourgeoisie's rule in case of the defeat of the revolution.
But the IRP in its turn only play a temporary role for the bourgeoisie. No doubt that the IRP is a determining political instrument for the bourgeoisie in the present situation. But precisely the same characteristics which enable the IRP to play its instrumental role at this juncture, is hindering it to become the class organisation of the monopoly bourgeoisie and thereby acquire a role in the governmental superstructure of the Iranian bourgeoisie in the event of defeat of the revolution. Because, firstly, the IRP has been set up to mobilise the petty-bourgeoisie and activate the individuals and political circles of the traditional petty-bourgeoisie. By the termination of the role of the petty-bourgeoisie as mere numbers, and the start of the bourgeoisie's final drive for an all-out reliance on the formal organs and instruments of its rule, the use of the IRP as a political instrument for the bourgeoisie will also comes to a halt. In other words, the government of the bourgeoisie can only be set up on the basis of the class organisation of the monopoly bourgeoisie. The IRP cannot be such an organisation, nor can it transform to the latter without a fundamental change. Secondly, and in relation with the first, Islam on which the IRP largely relies to play its role cannot be an ideological super-structure corresponding the economic sub-structure of Iran as an imperialist-dominated country. The extensive export of capital and commodities to Iran, the imperialist exploitation of the workers and toiling masses, the place of Iran in the global division of labour by imperialism and the determining role of the imperialist monopolies in the capitalist economy of Iran, demand, in the first place, an "imperialistic culture" --that is the ideological superstructure of the sway of the imperialist monopolies in the dominated country which can justify imperialist exploitation in its most modern forms. Islam in general, and the IRP's Islam, lays severe restrictions on these cultural needs of bourgeois exploitation by an ideological outlook which accords with the more backward forms of exploitation and production. The cultural existence of Iran prior to the revolution, and that of the countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand as well as numerous dominated countries in Latin America, clearly portray a "culture" which the capitalism of the epoch of monopolies is looking for, and only by essential changes and revisions can Islam adapt itself to this need of imperialism. On the other hand the IRP itself is rapidly destroying the remnants of Islamic beliefs of the masses, removing the last pre-capitalist ideological barriers to the bourgeoisie's drive for a fresh period of capital accumulation -- a period which can, and must, be hindered only by the revolutionary movement under the leadership of the proletariat. Bakhtiar, on behalf of the bourgeoisie, offered the clergy to step aside from the political scene and set up a "Vatican in Qom"[9]; now the IRP is providing the grounds for the realization of this, by suppressing the revolution in the name of theocracy and active participation of the clergy. A clergy which openly accomplishes its task serving the bourgeoisie and against workers and toiling masses, should retire from the political scene from the point of view of both the bourgeoisie and the masses. Finally, we must point to the existing class composition of the IRP; a composition which exhibits the historically contradictory character of the IRP as to the class interests it pursues on the one hand and the classes and strata it calls upon to rally under its banner on the other hand. On the one hand, the fact that the IRP most consistently serves to suppress the revolution -- by such conformity with the needs of the imperialist monopolies and their known and experienced methods at that -- can only suggest a virtual union between a lackey current within the IRP and certain imperialist monopolies and states. The existence of middlemen, capitalists and landowners who practically reap economic benefit thanks to the IRP's operation, indeed brings about a more direct connection between them and the IRP. The composition is coupled with the Savakies[10] , Rastakhizies[10] and thugs upon whom the IRP is relied for its day to day activities. On the other hand, the close relationship between the IRP and Khomeini and various sections of the clergy, the Islamic and so-called "anti-imperialist" propaganda by the IRP, the IRP's effort to mobilize the petty-bourgeoisie and also the fact that the IRP introduces itself as the heir to the revolution, all serve to draw certain unconscious petty-bourgeois circles to the IRP. In this way, the contradiction which exists in the goals and methods of the IRP, inevitably reflects in its composition; in one corner the assorted spies, middlemen, capitalists and landowners and thugs find shelter, and in another cornet the most backward petty-bourgeois masses and circles. The conflicts between these constituent elements of the IRP, which is now and then made public, add fuel to confusions and illusions about the IRP among the masses, and sometimes even among their vanguards. In any case, this party, with this composition, is not, and cannot be, what is needed by the bourgeoisie to handle the affairs of a society under its sway.
As long as the preludes to the unity of the bourgeoisie under the banner of monopoly capital are not provided, the bourgeoisie desperately needs both factions of the current ruling body. The tasks undertaken by the IRP and Bani-Sadr's bourgeois-liberal faction in the service of the bourgeoisie are not to be accomplished in separation from one another. This lay stress on the bourgeoisie's permanent need for the two methods of suppression and deceit. The policy of suppression without covers of "rightfulness" and "lawfulness", without being justified and concealed by a faction of the bourgeoisie and its politicians, would make evident its overtly terrorist and anti-human nature. The bourgeoisie can only introduce its interests ea the interests of "society" -- it cannot organise its oppression and exploitation but in the name of "society". The IRP cannot seek to suppress the revolutionary workers, massacre the revolutionaries, forcefully occupy Kurdistan and massacre the Kurdish fighters, impose a complete lack of right on the masses, without at the same time these acts being presented and justified in the name of the bourgeois society and its "law", "order" and "security". This is a task undertaken by the liberal bourgeoisie at this juncture. The methods and operation of the IRP, in the absence of this complementary role undertaken by the liberal bourgeoisie, will rapidly isolate it before the masses. The IRP is an agent in hastening the political polarization of the classes and especially in causing the masses to become disillusioned towards the Islamic government of the bourgeoisie. Without the liberal bourgeoisie and its religious and Bani-Sadrist faction, the IRP's methods would draw the bourgeoisie into a premature and all-sided confrontation with the masses; a confrontation which the bourgeoisie would not afford to endure at this juncture. In addition, a long-term Plan of counter-revolutionary activities to take back the gains of the revolution cannot be carried out in the complete absence of an executive centre -- the bourgeois State. Even where an extremist right-wing armed party holds the leadership of the bourgeoisie's activities, the state is a vital need for the bourgeoisie. The particular composition of' the IRP which is in accord with its practical need for mobilizing the backward masses of the petty-bourgeoisie, reduces the technocratic and bureaucratic capacity of the IRP to a minimum. As to running the affairs of a country by means of a broad state bureaucracy, the IRP does not enjoy the necessary facilities and conditions. This is a vacuum which Ls filled up at the present juncture mainly by the bourgeois-liberals. And finally, the liberals have undertaken to generalize the outcome of the counter-revolutionary violence led by the IRP, as achievements of the entire bourgeoisie, consolidating them legally and formally. While the IRP's thugs practically suppress in the streets the freedom of speech, gathering, publication, etc., while the IRP's mullahs and spokesmen do not for a moment cease to deceive and harass the masses, the liberals have undertaken to make "legal" and formal concessions in the interests of the entire bourgeoisie out of these advances. The attacks by the IRP's thugs against the gatherings of revolutionary opposition, especially those of the communists, against those bookshops selling the papers of the revolutionary groups, against libraries, etc., and daily agitation against the communists and the democratic forces such as Mojahedin-e-khalq, however frequent, widespread and successful they may be, would not turn into political achievements for the entire bourgeoisie unless the bourgeois government, enjoying the grounds these attacks have provided, once and for all proclaims as illegal the gathering, publication and any activity by the revolutionary opposition. It is only in such case that one can say the bourgeoisie as a class has taken a step towards reviving the Aryamehrian repression. Bani-Sadr's faction in the present government has precisely played such a role in numerous cases such as the suppression of revolutionary Kurdistan, the massacre of the revolutionary students and closure of the universities, prohibition of communist papers, declaration of strikes and political gatherings by the revolutionary and communist opposition as being illegal, and so forth.
But on the other hand, liberal deceit and demagogy can never go on, on its own; nor can it make the sole component or even the main component of the bourgeoisie's policy. Those who refer to Bani-Sadr's faction as being "realistic" and define the bourgeois-liberal policies of this faction as being in opposition to the IRP's policies and so the principled policies of the bourgeoisie, are precisely unaware of the very essential fact about liberalism in our country. The defence by Bani-Sadrism of "law" against the IRP's anarchism, and its support for "free debate" against the IRP's love for "club", may "deceive" and/or "draw to compromise" anybody only when the policy of violence and suppression primarily sweeps away form the society the grounds for the establishment of a real democratic law and also the existing actual conditions for free debate --what is already won by the workers and toiling masses through their struggles and bloody insurrection. If Bani-Sadr's faction is able to promise for "law" -- imperialist law --and deceive [the masses), if it can promise for "free debate" and "draw" the conciliatory within the revolutionary movement to bargaining, it is because the IRP has been able, in practice, to put into force the "above law" terrorism of the bourgeoisie, suppress without any debate and negotiations and practically violate the freedom of speech and gathering by means of club and at the bayonet-point. A success in the policy of deceit is the reflection of a success in the policy of suppression. Without the IRP, Bani-Sadrism will lose its necessity for the bourgeoisie and its effectiveness in deceiving the masses. The current use of Bani-Sadrism for the bourgeoisie is that while it consolidates and makes formal the practical achievements of the suppression for the bourgeoisie, it drives the growing hatred among the masses towards the other faction, and only to the other faction and not the whole of the bourgeoisie's government, and thus slowing down, on the whole, the process of masses' disillusionment towards the entire government, taking time for imperialism to make preparations for its final solution.
As long as the grounds for the emergence of the third political force which can unify the bourgeoisie have not come about, the two present factions of the ruling body are undeniable components of the bourgeoisie's confrontation with the continuation of revolution. The conflicts of the two factions, must, of necessity, be controlled at any Juncture so as not to endanger the basis of the unity of the entire ruling body. As long as the presence of Khomeini in the political scene is necessary and/or inevitable for the entire bourgeoisie, Islam and Khomeini would be a common basis for the conflicts of the two factions. The unifying role of Khomeini, which every now and then acquires an essential importance, prevents the conflicts of the two factions from escalating so much that the revolutionary movement may largely benefit from it. Khomeini is a symbol that the bourgeoisie has temporarily adopted in order to maintain its unity when the internal conflicts and rivalry heightens. Khomeini is the bourgeoisie's desire for unity which is objectified in a person.
No doubt that this is a shaky unity. The stable unity of the bourgeoisie requires the emergence of the direct representatives of monopoly capital in the practical scene of politics. Indeed, the political force unifying the bourgeoisie cannot be the product of the alliance and mechanical fusion of the two present factions. This political force will unite the bourgeoisie under a single banner, by negating both factions in their present reality, and nonetheless, by replacing the agent of the union of the two present factions -- Khomeini. Also, the characteristics of this third force, the synthesis, can-not be simply a "collection" of the characteristics of the present two factions; rather it will appear in advanced and purified forms of these characteristics. One cannot, of course, present a precise picture of the features of this synthesis; it may only he possible to discuss the most probable alter-native of the political leadership of the bourgeoisie with due attention to the preparations being made presently inside and outside the country, the manifest tendencies of the bourgeoisie towards the "Bakhtiarite" alternative and the probable agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and their priorities. But, in view of what we have so far said, we may explain the content and main outlines of the policies of this political synthesis in a more precise manner. The basis of movement of this third force lies in the fact that suppression and deceit should be carried on, but liberalism and theocracy must both be rejected. Hence, while Bani-Sadrism will suffer defeat in its attempt to bring Islam into conformity with liberalism, mainly due to incompatibility of liberalism with the needs of the bourgeoisie, the IRP whose suppressive operation is in conformity with the principal axis of the bourgeoisie's policy at this specific juncture, will lose its instrumental character mainly due to its unavoidable reliance on theocracy, and must be replaced with a political current which will defend the same policy but by non-Islamic justifications. The bourgeoisie and imperialism demand suppression without theocracy and order without liberalism. The realization of this demand of the bourgeoisie is the prime task of its future political leadership.
Notes
[4] This refers to an ideal society based on the holy book, Qoran, in which unity, justice and equality for all Moslems are accomplished. --Ed.
[5] Reference is made to a verse in Qoran concerning how the infidels must be dealt with. --Ed.
[6] Literal meaning is "Islamic Jurisprudent's Guardianship"; absolute authority in juridical and political systems exercised by clergy, and at the top of which the highest Ayatollah, representing God. --Ed.
[7] Imam is the title of Khomeini. --Ed.
[8] All prominent liberal figures of different factions and tendencies within the National Front (the original party of the Iranian Liberal bourgeoisie), or without it. --Ed.
[9] Reference is made to the last speech made in the parliament by Bakhtiar, the last premier appointed by the Shah; Qom is a major holy town near Tehran. --Ed.
[10] This refers to the remnants of the Shah's secret police and his party respectively, who Rave been since the Uprising actively serving the IRP. --Ed.
